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Abstract 
 
We address the design of point scoring 
mechanisms in games for crowds, to promote user 
motivations to contribute knowledge. We measure the 
effectiveness of the scoring mechanism on users’ 
performance across three types of crowd: general 
public, students in their field of study, general 
students. The conditions were: reward-free games 
(control group) and two reward-based systems 
differing in the algorithm applied (linear y=3x vs. 
exponential y=6e
x
). Results support the importance of 
the mathematical function of scores assignment as a 
motivator for knowledge contribution, and indicate 
that the effect of the scoring mechanism design 
should be tailored according to the type of crowd. 
These findings provide insights for designers of 
gamified systems on how to improve knowledge 
contributions in crowd-based systems.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
The success of knowledge pooling initiatives such 
as Wikipedia or Yahoo! Answers largely depends 
upon the motivation for participation of each 
contributor. The participation in crowd-based 
activities often follows a power law distribution, 
meaning that the crowd is heterogeneous in terms of 
motivation to contribute. However, the term 'crowd' 
in the literature often symbolizes a 'black box' of 
participants [1].  In this study we investigate the 
content of the 'black box' by probing the sensitivity of 
three types of crowd to various point scoring 
mechanism designs in a knowledge pooling 
assignment.  
Gamification has emerged as a way to describe 
interactive online design that incorporates game-like 
approaches such as immediate feedback and virtual 
rewards (points, badges, gifts etc.), or status 
indicators (levels, progress bar, count of likes/ 
friends/ followers/ retweets etc.). Gamification 
rapidly built momentum in industry [2] and academia 
creating a stream of research [3,4].  To date, 
gamification is applied in marketing  as well as non-
business contexts such as politics, health [5], problem 
solving [6], work [7], online communities and social 
network [4]; computer science and engineering [8, 9] 
crowdsourcing [4, 6] and education [10]. 
Gamification brings opportunities but it is still 
unclear whether it is used properly in order to reach 
objectives [3, 4].  
Gamification and crowdsourcing can be 
considered as interrelated as they share 
commonalities [11]: potentially large user numbers, 
requirements for scalability, potential for reusable 
functionality etc. Researchers see gamification as a 
way to incentivize people to voluntarily contribute to 
crowdsourcing tasks [3, 4, 11-13]. Still, these studies 
share several weaknesses: relying on a small sample 
size, simultaneous implementation of several 
gamification elements, lack of comparative 
examination of various types of crowd involved, 
disregard of individual characteristics. So far, scant 
research has been conducted to draw clear 
conclusions as to which specific game element would 
work better in certain situations and types of crowd. 
This dearth of understanding prevents organizations 
from adopting and designing effective gamification 
approaches.  
The present study aims to: 1) shed light on the 
impact of the scoring mechanism design on players’ 
behavior in a game designed for pooling knowledge.  
2) examine the term crowds in regard to gamification 
while comparing different types of crowd in one 
gamification implementation 3) empirically evaluate 
scoring mechanism effectiveness as a tool for 
motivating and engaging users in non-entertainment 
contexts 4) strengthen the theoretical foundations of 
gamification. 
After a brief introduction to gamification and 
crowds, the ﬁrst part of this paper examines the 
motivational factors of scores and how scoring 
mechanism design can be associated with behavior. 
Following a description of Guess, a knowledge-
pooling game for crowds, which serves as our 
research tool, we describe a repeated measures 
experiment to investigate how scoring patterns 
influence users’ performance.  We end this paper 
with a summary of ﬁndings, including suggestions 
for future research.  
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2. Background 
   
2.1. Gamification and crowds 
 
The development of social Web technologies 
enables harnessing large crowds of users for various 
tasks such as contribution of knowledge, data 
collection, and problem solving activities [14, 15]. 
The body of literature on crowdsourcing has been 
rapidly growing [11] offering four categories to 
describe crowdsourcing systems: crowdsolving, 
crowdcreation, crowdrating and crowdprocessing 
[16] and a conceptual framework of crowd capital 
[13, 17]. An active crowd of participants is crucial for 
such systems, raising the question of providing 
tailored incentives that will promote user motivation 
[18, 19]. Traditional approaches focus on economic 
approaches including tangible incentives such as 
monetary prizes [4, 11, 18, 19], algorithmic  
approaches such as improving software [20], 
encouraging social-psychological perspectives on the 
notion of gaining reputation [21], or expression of 
open-source ideology [22]. A recent direction is 
offering the enjoyable qualities of gameplay in non-
game systems, coined as gamification [23].   
Consequently, gamification can be seen as an aspect 
of incentives for people to voluntarily contribute to 
crowdsourcing tasks. Well-known examples in this 
regard are: Foldit 
1
 [24], Phrase Detective
2
 [25], 
Phylo
3
, DARPA Formal Verification program
4
 and 
Games with a Purpose (GWAP) [26].  
Gamification has become a popular strategic 
instrument to engage people in a given activity, to 
influence behavior and increase performance and 
productivity in various contexts [12, 27, 28]. It is one 
of the major instruments for driving users’ motivation 
in crowdsourcing systems [4], i.e “Transforming 
Homo Economicus into Homo Ludens” [29].  
Interestingly, most studies combining 
crowdsourcing and gamification consider the term 
'crowd' as a uniform concept that varies in amount 
rather than type, referring to an unspecified crowd 
[1]. Early empirical studies in this direction suggest 
to examine effects of gender and age on gamification 
effectiveness [4, 30]. Our study questions the overall 
crowd type rather than its particular composition. 
Given the gamified system, our focus is on 
differences in gamification effectiveness among three 
types of crowd: general public (GenPub), general 
                                                 
1
 https://fold.it/portal/  
2 https://anawiki.essex.ac.uk/phrasedetectives/  
3 http://phylo.cs.mcgill.ca/#!/EN  
4 http://www.scientificamerican.com/citizen-science/darpa-
verigames-crowdsourced-formal-verification-csfv-project/  
students (GenStu), and expert students (ExpStu), 
defined in Table 2.  
 
2.2. Motivation theories  
 
We test score mechanism design as motivator for 
sharing knowledge in a game for crowds,  drawing on 
Csikszentmihalyi's Flow theory [31] and self-
determination theory [32] to examine motivational 
effects in crowdsourcing [33] and gamification [3, 4, 
12, 34]. Scores can be regarded as providing 
feedback which is an important antecedent to flow 
and engagement, and are mapped to the competence 
aspect of self-determination theory [4, 12, 27]. 
According to the game design elements taxonomy 
provided by Blohm and Leimeister, mechanisms such 
as scoring systems or badges create dynamics of 
collection which satisfy achievement motivation [27]. 
Thus, the motivational appeal of points is based upon 
their cumulative nature. By adding a certain number 
of points for completed actions to users’ accounts the 
game keeps users engaged and encourages them to 
remain active [26, 35]. Although scoring mechanism 
design is a key component in making engaging 
games, only few empirical studies to date investigate 
their role on users’ motivation and behavior [36-41]. 
The current study aims to address this gap.  
Motivation is usually divided to intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivational factors.  Intrinsic motivation 
applies to doing something because it is inherently 
interesting or enjoyable, while extrinsic motivation 
refers to doing something because it leads to a 
separable outcome [42]. In contrast, self-
determination theory (SDT) defines intrinsic and 
subtypes of extrinsic motivation as falling along a 
continuum of internalization [32]. Cognitive 
evaluation theory (CET) and organismic integration 
theory (OIT) two sub-theories of SDT are of great 
importance in the study of gamification. According to 
CET, feedback, which is perceived as informing 
one’s mastery, supports the need for competence and, 
subsequently, enhances intrinsic motivation. 
However, if feedback is perceived as controlling, 
then it reduces intrinsic motivation [42]. Within OIT, 
supports for autonomy and relatedness are critical to 
internalization; individuals can experience a sense of 
autonomy even when behaviors are extrinsically 
rewarded [42]. The idea of contributing to collective 
good; voluntary participation and full control on 
one’s action; feedback messages and scores to 
develop competence and self-competition are the 
implementation of SDT in our study.  
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2.3. Motivational factors of points and scores 
 
Within games, points play various roles: as a 
scoring system, a progression indicator, scale of rank, 
goal setting tool or even as a currency [12, 43]. 
Removal of a points-based incentive system can 
make a negative impact on players’ activity; it may 
reduce overall participation [36]. Points add 
excitement to games by creating an artificial ladder 
from which players can fall if they make a mistake 
[39]. Points stimulate self-regulation and self-
efficacy by providing direct input on performance, 
and thus afford regulating and monitoring 
performance more accurately [12]. The social effect 
of points ranges from status earned by performing 
certain actions up to reputation that is based on 
ratings received by others. Therefore, the 
motivational aspect of points is outlined with the help 
of social motivations as well as needs-based theories 
and rewards-based theory [12]. Gamification in 
crowdsourcing often uses a metric (scores) as a core 
reward for users’ effort [11]. Further analyzing the 
scoring mechanism in regard to the four types of 
crowdsourcing systems based on [16] reveals that in 
most crowd-processing, crowd rating and crowd 
solving settings, the scoring mechanism design 
measures task fulfillment. Only few studies to date 
have provided an explanation or describe how the 
scoring mechanism is actually designed in crowd-
created settings [11, 38, 40, 44]. Consequently it 
remains a question to explore.  
 
3. Research questions  
 
The lack of comprehensive understanding of 
scoring mechanism constrains the design of effective 
incentive systems for crowdsourcing. To evaluate the 
effect of the scoring system we designed a controlled 
study. In this context, we present three main research 
questions that summarize the goals of this study. 
RQ1: Does assigning points affect performance in 
games for crowds? If so, how? 
RQ2: How do different score mechanism designs 
affect performance in games for crowds?  
Further, both crowdsourcing and gamification can 
take a variety of forms, and it would be myopic to 
assume that the same gamification implementations 
would function similarly across different types of 
crowd and different crowdsourcing approaches.  
RQ3: Does the effect of the scoring design on users' 
performance depend on the type of crowd 
participating? 
    
 
4. Method 
  
4.1. GUESS:  a game for crowds 
 
We used a crowd- based knowledge pooling word 
association game called “Guess” which was 
developed by IBM
5
. Knowledge accumulates by 
prompting questions simultaneously to all users who, 
in turn, receive points for responses. 
Figure 1.  Main game interface 
 
4.1.1. User interface. Users access a personalized 
home screen where they select a game to play from 
the available games.  Figure 1 presents the main 
game interface. A question with an input box appears 
on top (example question: Name famous scientists). 
Users are encouraged to submit as many responses as 
they can by typing them in the input box within the 
time frame of 60 seconds per question (Example 
responses: Einstein, Newton, Curie). By pressing the 
SKIP button users can move on to the next question 
before the time expires or if they prefer not to 
respond. Responses are presented in the peripheral 
circles (see Figure 1). The black dots denote 
responses given by other users. Once the user types a 
response that had been already given by another user, 
the black dot opens and the response appears, 
however, there is no direct interaction between users 
[1]. Additional on-screen information includes: time 
remaining, user’s statistics (dynamic update of 
current total points), basic game statistics (number of 
players, number of responses given by all players).  
Once users enter a response they receive a feedback 
message. We used 3 types of text messages: (1) ‘You 
got X points’- indicating how many points were 
gained for the current response; (2) ‘you already 
mentioned this answer’ to inform users when they 
type a response that they have already mentioned; (3) 
acknowledging submission by ‘submitted ABC’ 
(ABC= response) specifically for reward-free games. 
                                                 
5
 GUESS- Gaming Umbrella for Enterprise Social Sourcing 
https://www.research.ibm.com/haifa/projects/imt/social/guess.shtm
l 
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The game ends with a "game over" notification and a 
display of some game statistics and a leaderboard. 
 
4.1.2. Designing the score mechanism. For this 
study a new scoring wizard was implemented in the 
game in order to allow fast adjustments of the 
algorithm applied. The goal was to compare reward-
free gaming with external rewards in the form of 
points.  Beyond that we compared usage of a 
monotonic and expected linear scoring mechanism 
with an irregular and incalculable (for the user) 
scoring mechanism. Three reward conditions were 
implemented: (1) reward-free condition (control); and 
two conditions that differ in the algorithm applied; 
(2) linear function: y=3x (3) exponential function: 
y=6e
x
. The linear score-keeping function provides the 
user a constant number of points for each submitted 
response. Because such functions are regular, users 
may become uninterested and quit the game.  Part of 
the fun of games comes from their unexpected nature 
[45].  In order to make game scores less predictable, 
we introduced a new function using an exponential 
progression. Although both conditions present 
positive and ever growing scores, in the linear 
condition users can figure out fairly quickly how the 
scores are calculated and will know what to expect, 
while in the second condition the score is unexpected. 
Figure 2 illustrates point accumulations in both 
functions. 
 
Figure 2. Point accumulation linear vs. 
exponential function 
 
4.2. Operationalizing performance  
 
Following common behavioral metrics of 
performance in gamification research we suggest to 
look at users’ performance in two dimensional prism: 
the outcome and the process. Table 1 depicts these 
two dimensions along with some metrics GUESS 
produces for each user (log analysis). 
 
Table 1. Performance metrics
6
 
 Dependent 
variable 
Metrics (calculation) 
Outcome 
 
Contribution  Average amount of content 
contributed (# of 
responses) per question  
Participation Percentage of questions 
answered (proportion of 
answered questions out of 
all questions available in a 
game) 
Process Duration Average gameplay time per 
question  
Engagement 
time 
 
Utilization of  playing time  
(proportion of gameplay 
time out of maximum 
possible time) 
 
4.3. Procedure 
 
GUESS was deployed implementing a control 
and two manipulations of scoring mechanism designs 
in two events of The European Researchers' Night 
which is a “popular science and fun learning“ event 
open to the general public, and in five university 
courses, three at the Faculty of Management and two 
at the Faculty of Education. Participation was 
voluntary; yet we offered a modest prize (a pair of 
movie tickets) to the highest score in the Researchers' 
Night events; lecturers rewarded their students with 1 
or 2 bonus points for participation.  
Participants were asked to play one game in each 
of the three experimental conditions: reward-free 
games (users saw a pop-up message indicating their 
contribution), and 2 reward-based systems differing 
in the algorithm applied (linear y=3x vs. exponential 
y=6e
x
). Participants selected the order in which to 
play the games. A pop-up message indicated the 
number of points earned for the current response 
contribution. The data collected from this period 
includes 21 games, 7 games in each scoring 
condition. Group size (number of participants in a 
game) ranges from 13 to 53. A total of 17,752 
responses were gathered, distributed as follow: 
reward-free games 3,681 responses, linear 6,697 
responses and exponential 7,374 responses. For the 
evaluation, we examined the server logs, which 
documented the details of each response provided by 
users in a game along with a time-stamp. 
 
                                                 
6
 We use the natural logarithm transformation for both 
contribution and duration in order to transform data to normal 
distribution 
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4.4. Participants 
 
We identified three types of crowd: general 
public, expert students and general students as 
defined in Table 2. 576 participants played at least 
one game in one of three conditions (Table 3). 53 
participants replayed at least one game; for them we 
calculated the average of contributed responses along 
the repeated games. The number of game replays for 
a user in a certain game varied between 1 to 10 times 
(Table 4).  
 
Table 2. Types of crowd, size and definition 
 
Table 3. Number of participants per condition 
Condition Notation  N % 
Reward-free c0 183 31.77 
Linear score mechanism c1 192 33.33 
Exponential score 
mechanism 
c2 201 34.90 
 
We compare behavioral performance among the 
three scoring conditions in regard to three types of 
crowd. The independent variables are: the scoring 
mechanism design (c0, c1, c2), the types of crowd 
(t1, t2, t3), group size (d; number of participants in a 
certain game) and number of game rounds (k). The 
dependent variable, performance, was introduced in 
Table 1. 
 
5. Results  
 
To compare results from manipulation conditions 
with those from control condition an HLM
7 
model 
(Hierarchical Linear Modeling) was conducted. The 
                                                 
7
 HLM can accommodate nested data structure with repeated 
observations on the same participant, with a lack of sphericity and 
missing data.  
 
Table 4. Distribution of game-rounds 
 
random variable was the user, the explanatory 
variables: scoring mechanism design(c), type of 
crowds (t), group size (d) and number of game 
rounds (k). The dependent variables were: 
contribution, participation, duration, and engagement 
time. A backward elimination procedure was used, 
whereby non-significant terms were dropped one by 
one and the model re-assessed to determine the 
significance of each of the remaining variables at 
every stage.  
Contribution:  Table 5.1 shows the final set of 
variables in the model. The analysis yielded that all 
effects were statistically significant at p < .05. 
 
Table 5.1 Model results showing factors 
affecting mean change in contribution 
Variables in the 
model 
df F  Sig 
Condition (c) 2 6.99 0.0011 
Group size (d) 1 23.10 <.0001 
Type of crowds (t) 2 25.80 <.0001 
c*t 4 2.68 0.0315 
A Post hoc analysis using the Bonferroni 
correction further revealed that for GenPub (t1) the 
mean for the exponential scoring design (c2)  was 
significantly higher than the means for both the linear 
and reward–free conditions (M = 1.71,  SD =0.68; M 
= 1.52,  SD = 0.6; M = 1.63, SD = 0.59 respectively).  
No significant difference was found between the 
linear (c1) and reward –free conditions (c0). For the 
ExpStu (t2) the mean of the exponential condition 
(c2) was significantly higher than the mean for 
reward-free condition (c0) (M = 1.45, SD =0.72, M = 
1.18, SD = 0.62; respectively). No significant 
difference was found when the linear and reward-free 
conditions were compared or when the linear and 
exponential were compared.  For the GenStu (t3) no 
significant differences were found among the three 
Types of 
crowd  
N % Definition  
GenPub 
general 
public  
(t1) 
 
154 26.74 People attending The 
European Researchers' 
Night events, answering  
general questions that 
require common 
knowledge 
ExpStu 
expert 
students 
(t2) 
202 35.07 
 
Students responding to 
professional questions 
in their field of study  
GenStu 
general 
students(t3)  
220 38.19 Students responding to 
general questions  
K=no. of 
game-
rounds 
 
Frequency Percent Frequencies 
according to 
respective 
types of crowd 
t1 t2 t3 
1 523 90.80 139 194 190 
2 40 6.94 11 7 22 
3 6 1.04 4  2 
4 3 0.52  1 2 
5 2 0.35   2 
6 1 0.17   1 
10 1 0.17   1 
Page 1132
conditions. The interaction can be seen in Figure 3. In 
addition, group size main effect was significant 
(F(1,325)=23.10, p<.001) indicating that the larger the 
group, the lower the contribution of responses.  
Figure 3. Interaction plot for contribution 
 
Participation: a hierarchical logistic model was 
conducted to predict the probability to fulfill the task 
i.e. answering all the questions in the game (or logout 
from the game before it ends). Table 5.2 shows the 
results of the regression analysis. 
 
Table 5.2  Model results showing factors 
affecting mean change in participation 
Variables in the model df F Value Sig 
Condition (c) 2 5.24 0.0058 
Group size (d) 1 5.61 0.0186 
Type of crowds (t) 2 19.49 <.0001 
c*t 4 6.27 <.0001 
The analysis yielded that all effects were 
statistically significant at p < .05 significance level. 
Further analysis using the Bonferroni correction 
revealed that for the GenPub (t1) the probability of 
answering all questions and completing the task for 
the linear  scoring design (c1)  was significantly 
lower than both the exponential and reward–free 
conditions (45%, 59%, 61% respectively).  No 
significant difference was found between the 
exponential (c2) and reward–free conditions (c0). For 
the ExpStu (t2) the exponential condition (c2) was 
significantly lower than reward-free and linear 
conditions (66%, 83% and 79% respectively). No 
significant difference was found when the linear and 
reward free conditions were compared. For the 
GenStu group (t3) the linear scoring design (c1) was 
significantly lower than both the exponential and 
reward–free conditions (77%, 83%, 82% 
respectively).  No significant difference was found 
between the exponential (c2) and reward–free 
conditions (c0) (Figure 4). These results suggests that 
for both GenPub and GenStu it may be more 
effective to use reward-free or exponential  scoring 
design while for ExpStu  exponential scoring design 
may be a less effective method to promote 
participation. In addition, there was a significant 
main effect of group size (F(1,284)=5.61, p < .05) 
indicating that participation decreases the larger the 
group. 
Figure 4. Participation per crowd type and 
scoring mechanism 
 
Duration: Table 5.3 shows the final set of 
variables in the model in regard to duration. 
   
Table 5.3 Model results showing factors 
affecting mean change in duration 
Variables in the model df F Value Sig 
Condition (c) 2 3.07 0.0480 
Group size (d) 1 5.67 0.0178 
Type of crowds (t) 2 16.92 <.0001 
The analysis yielded that all main effects were 
statistically significant at p < .05. For the main effect 
of score design (F(2, 329) = 3.07, p < .05), indicates that 
there is an overall significant difference in means, 
post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction 
revealed that duration was significantly higher for 
exponential condition (M = 3.94, SD = 0.29) than for 
reward-free (M = 3.88, SD = 0.29). There was no 
statistically significant difference between the linear 
and both reward free and exponential scoring.  For 
the main effect of types of crowd  (F(2, 329) = 16.92, p 
< .001), post hoc tests using the Bonferroni 
correction revealed that duration was significantly 
higher for GenStu (t3)  (M = 4.01, SD = 0.18) than 
for both GenPub (t1) and ExpStu (t2) (M = 3.90, SD 
= 0.31; M = 3.79, SD = 0.38; respectively).  There 
was no statistically significant difference between t1 
and t2. Figure 5 illustrates the findings. 
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Figure 5. Duration per crowd type and 
scoring mechanism 
 
In addition, group size main effect was significant 
(F(1,329)=5.67, p<.05) indicating that duration 
decreases the larger the group.   
Engagement time:  The analysis yielded that all 
main effects were statistically significant at the p < 
.05 significance level as can be seen in Table 5.4. 
 
Table 5.4 Model results showing factors 
affecting mean change in engagement time 
Variables in the model df F Value Sig 
Condition (c) 2 4.16 0.0165 
Group size (d) 1 10.51 0.0013 
Type of crowds (t) 2 24.91 <.0001 
Number of game rounds (k) 1 37.22 <.0001 
c*t 4 2.41 0.0490 
A Post hoc analysis using the Bonferroni 
correction further revealed that for the GenPub (t1) 
the mean for the exponential scoring design (c2)  was 
significantly higher than the means for both the linear 
and reward–free conditions (M = 0.76,  SD =0.30; M 
= 0.68,  SD = 0.34; M = 0.72, SD = 0.31 
respectively).  No significant difference was found 
between the linear (c1) and reward–free conditions 
(c0). For the ExpStu (t2) no significant difference  
 
 
Figure 6. Interaction plot for engagement 
time 
 
was found between the three conditions. For the 
GenStu(t3) the mean for the exponential scoring 
design (c2) was significantly higher than the mean 
for the reward free condition (M = 0.9, SD =0.19; M 
= 0.84, SD = 0.21 respectively).  No significant 
differences were found between the linear (c1) and 
both reward–free and exponential conditions. The 
interaction can be seen in Figure 6. 
In addition there were main effects of group size (d) 
and of number of game rounds (k).   
Generalizing the observations, the exponential 
reward function leads to higher contribution, 
participation, duration, and engagement time in the 
GenPub and GenStu groups.  Exponential points 
reward catalyzes knowledge pooling. The GenPub 
responded similarly to the GenStu but at lower rates, 
i.e. it is more difficult to pool knowledge from the 
GenPub compared to the GenStu.  The hardest 
challenge is to pool knowledge from the ExpStu 
accompanied by a surprisingly short duration.  
Possibly, less fun (serious questions) leads to less 
participation and contribution and less attention 
displayed by duration. 
 
6. Discussion  
 
Designing a game scoring mechanism to support 
achieving objectives is a relevant practical issue, as 
well as an academic interest particularly in light of 
the increased use of gamification in recent years [3, 
4, 29, 46]. Most of the studies in gamification 
embedded a combination of motivational factors: 
points, leaderboards, and levels [41], dual point 
systems  and rating [6, 37, 38], leaderboards, ranking, 
unlocking information [47], progress, points, ranking, 
network [48], leaderboard, badges [49], challenge, 
progress bar, theme, rewards [44], badges, levels[50], 
points, levels, avatar [44]. The distinct effect of point 
scores on users’ behavior and motivation is still 
vague, a gap we wish to narrow.   
The current study focuses on the effect of scoring 
design on each of three types of crowd in an 
implementation of a knowledge pooling game for 
crowds. We applied three scoring mechanisms: 
reward-free, linear and exponential in three types of 
crowd:  GenPub, ExpStu and GenStu.  We examined 
contribution of responses, participation, duration, and 
engagement time as dependent variables. Results 
showed a significant interaction between score design 
mechanism and types of crowd indicating that the 
groups behaved differently in reaction to the scoring 
condition. The analysis for duration yielded main 
effects for the scoring condition and type of crowd.  
Overall, in answer to our research questions we 
can generalize the following assertions: 1. 
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implementing a point allocation mechanism promotes 
performance depending on the implementation. 2. 
linear point progression is detrimental to performance 
while exponential score allocation is favorable. 3.  A 
crowd of experts is more difficult to mobilize than 
general crowds.  Given general questions, students 
show better performance than the general public.  In 
the following we unpack the particular observations 
that led to these generalizations. 
Looking into the contribution behavior (amount 
of content) results suggests that for the GenPub and 
for the ExpStu exponential scoring design may be the 
more effective method when compared to linear and 
reward-free conditions. The GenStu appear to be 
indifferent toward these different scoring designs 
methods. Exponential scoring design may also be the 
more effective method to increase duration when 
compared to the reward-free condition, while the 
difference between the linear and both reward-free 
and exponential scoring was found to be 
insignificant.   
Examining the types of crowd it appears that 
GenStu participants spend a longer time on each 
question compared to the other two groups. 
Examining engagement time more closely, it appears 
that exponential scoring design is more effective 
when compared to reward-free conditions for both 
the GenPub and the GenStu. In regard to the GenPub, 
it is also more effective when compared to linear 
condition. In contrast, the ExpStu appear to be 
indifferent about different scoring designs methods 
relating to engagement time.   
Participation in the GenStu group was 
significantly higher than that of the GenPub, yet it is 
interesting to observe that the same pattern occurred 
for both GenPub and GenStu (t1 and t3). For these 
two groups both exponential scoring design and 
reward free condition seem to be more effective 
when compared to the linear condition. ExpStu seems 
to be indifferent for reward free and linear condition. 
Thus, it appears that linear scoring is least effective.  
To conclude, the present study highlights the 
importance of point scoring mechanism design in 
games for crowds. Findings suggest that linear 
reward crowds out intrinsic motivation while 
exponential reward may strengthen motivation in 
relation to the reward free condition. Table 6 
summarizes the complete matrix of the experiment 
results. Interestingly, the percentage of questions 
answered (participation) by the ExpStu (t2) was 
significantly lower in the exponential condition 
compared to the other conditions and ExpStu 
exploited less of the available game time (lower 
engagement time), yet the average responses per 
question answered was significantly higher.  This 
suggests that scores enhance intrinsic motivation, 
because mere “hunger” for points would lead to full 
usage of the available game time and questions. 
Participation for GenPub was almost the same for 
exponential and reward free conditions, yet 
engagement time and contribution were significantly 
higher in exponential scores. This suggests that 
scores serve as informative feedback generating 
motivation. 
Table 6. Summary of the exponential 
condition 
Expone
ntial vs. 
reward 
free 
Contribu
tion 
Durati
on 
Engage
ment 
Participa
tion 
t1 
GenPub 
 + n.s  - n.s 
t2 
ExpStu 
 + n.s - n.s  
t3 
GenStu 
+ n.s   - n.s 
 
6.1. Limitations and Future Research  
 
The main limitation of the current study is the 
sample size which is modest considering we are 
interested in crowds.  Another limitation is that we 
implemented just two score design mechanisms.  
This being an experiment, although a natural 
experiment as far as the general public goes, external 
validity may be questioned. 
The ﬁndings suggest several points of departure 
for future research: 1) Group size – the effect of 
group size was significant in regard to our variables, 
indicating that the larger the group the lower the 
contribution of responses, participation and duration 
per question. This may imply diffusion of 
responsibility.  It may be the expected emergence of 
a power law distribution, a well-known phenomenon 
of the web [51], which leads to higher diversity in 
levels of participation.  2) Replaying- repeated play 
(k) has a significant effect on engagement time. This 
raises the question of differences between highly-
motivated users and average users and could also 
provide new insights into the design of effective 
gamified crowdsourcing systems for different target 
groups. 3) Quality- in the current study users were 
rewarded with points for every response. Our next 
step will be to explore the quality of responses.  
 
6.2. Conclusions  
 
This work contributes to the area of 
crowdsourcing and gamification, especially games 
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for crowds. Its main novelty lies in bringing together 
crowdsourcing and game capabilities for different 
scoring mechanism designs. When designing crowd-
based knowledge pooling, gamification can help if 
implemented according to our findings.  I.e., care 
should be taken in selecting whether and how to use 
points, and attention should focus on the type of 
crowd as well as the relation between the type of 
knowledge collected and the type of crowd.   
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[13] J. Prpić and P. Shukla, "The Theory of Crowd 
Capital," in Proceedings of the 46th Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences,  (HICSS), pp. 3505-3514, 
2013. 
[14] M.K. Poetz and M. Schreier, "The value of 
crowdsourcing: Can users really compete with 
professionals in generating new product ideas?" Journal of 
Product Innovation Management , vol. 29, pp. 245-256, 
2012.  
[15] P. Whitla, "Crowdsourcing and Its Application in 
Marketing Activities," Contemporary Management 
Research, vol. 5, pp. 15-28, 2009.  
[16] D. Geiger and M. Schader, "Personalized task 
recommendation in crowdsourcing information systems—
Current state of the art," Decis.Support Syst., vol. 65, pp. 3-
16, 2014. 
[17] J. Prpić and P. Shukla, "Crowd Science: 
Measurements, Models, and Methods," in Proceedings of 
the 49th Hawaii International Conference on System 
Sciences (HICSS), pp. 4365, 2016.  
[18] C. Haythornthwaite, "Crowds and communities: Light 
and heavyweight models of peer production," in 
Proceedings of the 42nd Hawaii International Conference 
on System Sciences, HICSS'09, pp. 1-10, 2009.  
[19] M. Vukovic, J. Laredo and S. Rajagopal, "Challenges 
and experiences in deploying enterprise crowdsourcing 
service," in Proceedings of the 10th International 
Conference on Web Engineering, pp. 460-467, 2010. 
[20] A.J. Quinn and B.B. Bederson, "Human computation: 
a survey and taxonomy of a growing field," in Proceedings 
of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in 
Computing Systems, pp. 1403-1412, 2011.  
 [21] S. Rafaeli and Y. Ariel, "Online Motivational Factors: 
Incentives for Participation and Contribution in 
Wikipedia," Psychological Aspects of Cyberspace: Theory, 
Research, Applications, pp. 243-267, 2008.  
[22] S. Oreg and O. Nov, "Exploring motivations for 
contributing to open source initiatives: The roles of 
contribution context and personal values," 
Comput.Hum.Behav., vol. 24, pp. 2055-2073, 9. 2008.  
 [23] S. Deterding, M. Sicart, L. Nacke, K. O'Hara and D. 
Dixon, " Gamification: Using Game Design Elements in 
Non-Gaming Contexts," in Proceedings of the 2011 Annual 
Conference Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in 
Computing Systems, CHI EA ’11, ACM New York, NY, 
USA: ACM, 2011, pp. 2425-2428.  
[24] S. Cooper, F. Khatib, A. Treuille, J. Barbero, J. Lee, 
M. Beenen, A. Leaver-Fay, D. Baker and Z. Popović, 
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